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PROMOTING SOCIAL CHANGE IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC:
THE NEED FOR A DISABILITY RIGHTS TRIBUNAL TO GIVE
LIFE TO THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF
PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES
MICHAEL L. PERLIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
There is no question that the existence of regional human rights
courts and commissions has been an essential element in the
enforcement of international human rights in those regions of the
world where such tribunals exist. In the specific area of mental
disability law, there is now a remarkably robust body of case law
from the European Court on Human Rights (ECtHR), some signif-
icant and transformative decisions from the Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights (Inter-American Commission), and at
least one major case from the African Commission on Human
Rights (African Commission). In Asia and the Pacific region, how-
ever, there is no such body. Although the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) charter refers to human rights, that body
cannot be seen as a significant enforcement tool in this area of law
and policy. Many reasons have been offered for the absence of a
regional human rights tribunal in Asia, the most frequently cited of
these is the perceived conflict between what are often denomi-
nated as "Asian values" and universal human rights. What is clear
is that the lack of such a court or commission has been a major
impediment in the movement to enforce disability rights in Asia.
The need for such a body has further intensified since the ratifi-
cation of the United Nations' Convention on the Rights of Persons
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helpful research assistance, Yoshi Ikehara for his inspirational work on the creation of the
Disability Rights Tribunal for Asia and the Pacific (DRTAP), and Heather Ellis Cucolo for
both her work on the creation of the Disability Rights Information Center for Asia and the
Pacific and her extraordinarily helpful editorial suggestions and recommendations.
1
The Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev.
with Disabilities (CRPD).' The CRPD clearly establishes, through
hard law, the international human and legal rights of persons with
disabilities, but in order for it to be more than a mere paper vic-
tory, it must be enforced. Only then, can we begin to be optimistic
about the real-life impact of the CRPD on the rights of persons
with disabilities in Asian and the Pacific region.
The empirical evidence is clear: in all regions of the world, per-
sons with mental disabilities-especially those institutionalized
because of such disabilities-are uniformly deprived of their civil
and human rights.2 The creation of a Disability Rights Tribunal for
Asia and the Pacific (DRTAP) would be the first necessary step
leading to amelioration of this deprivation. It would be a bold,
innovative, progressive, and important step on the path towards
realization of those rights. It would also be, ultimately, a likely
inspiration for a full regional human rights tribunal in this area of
the world. If it were created, however, it is also clear that it would
be an empty victory absent available and knowledgeable lawyers to
represent individuals seeking to litigate there.
This Article will first consider the existence and role of regional
human rights tribunals in regions other than Asia. Part Two briefly
discusses some of the important disability rights cases litigated in
those tribunals so as to demonstrate how regional tribunals have
had a significant impact on the lives of persons with disabilities.
Part Three considers the need for a body like DRTAP, focusing
specifically on the gap between current domestic law on the books
and how such law is practiced in reality, as well as the importance
of what is termed the "Asian values" debate. This section of the
Article concludes that this debate leads to a false consciousness
because it presumes a unified and homogenous multi-regional atti-
tude towards a bundle of social, cultural, and political issues, and
that the universality of human rights must be seen to predominate
over differences in cultural values.
This Article then explain why the CRPD is a paradigm-shattering
instrument that truly is the "first day of the rest of our lives" for
anyone who works in this field, and why the creation of the DRTAP
is timely, inevitable, and essential if the CRPD is to be given true
1. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,Jan. 24, 2007, 2515 U.N.T.S.
3, 46 I.L.M. 443 [hereinafter CRPD].
2. See Michael L. Perlin, International Human Rights Law and Comparative Mental Disa-
bility Law: The Universal Factors, 34 SYRACUSEJ. INT'L L. & CoM. 333, 335 (2007) [hereinafter
Perlin, The Universal Factors]; MICHAEL L. PERLIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND
MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: WHEN THE SILENCED ARE HEARD 25 (2011) [hereinafter PERLIN,
WHEN THE SILENCED ARE HEARD].
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effect. Finally, this Article briefly summarizes the work that has
already been done on the creation of a DRTAP, and how this work
needs to continue in the future. This Article concludes by looking
at the role of counsel in the representation of persons with mental
disabilities, the current lack of counsel experienced in this subject
matter in Asia and the Pacific, and the importance of training law-
yers to provide adequate representation before DRTAP, ensuring
that this tribunal would have an authentic impact on social change.
II. REGIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS BODIES OUTSIDE ASIA
A. An Overview
A regional human rights court is an engine that provides real
and practical meaning to each provision of an international
human rights instrument to citizens, and that universalizes these
meanings.3 These universalized meanings can be adopted and
incorporated in an almost symbiotic way by other regional courts
and tribunals. This engine of social and political change thus
dynamically sharpens and clarifies a normative and practical mean-
ing of international human rights law.
Asia and the Pacific is the only area of the world that does not
have a regional human rights court or commission. The countries
of Europe established the ECtHR in 1956 and renewed its charter
3. Michael L. Perlin, The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the Disabil-
ity Rights Tribunal for Asia and the Pacific, and the Future of Online Legal Education in Chinese
Schools as a Means of Training Lawyers to Represent Persons with Disabilities 2 (N.Y. Law Sch.,
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10/11 #16, 2011) [hereinafter Perlin, CRPD], available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1743730; see also Karen Alter, The
Evolving International judiciary, ANN. REV. L. & Soc. Sci., Dec. 2011, at 387, 387 (discussing
international tribunals and stating that "there are currently 26 permanent international
courts and well over a hundred quasi-legal and ad hoc systems that interpret international
rules and assess compliance with international law"). There is a wealth of scholarship on
the empirical impact of human rights instruments on actual human rights behavior. See
generally Linda Camp Keith, The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights: Does It Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior?, 36 J. PEACE REs. 95 (1999) (cau-
tioning against expectation that being a treaty party would produce directly observable
effect on behavior); Li-ann Thio, Reading Rights Rightly: The UDHR and Its Creeping Influence
on the Development of Singapore Public Law, 2008 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 264 (2008) (discussing
impact of Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) on Singapore law); Eric
Neumayer, Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?, 49 J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 925 (2005); Mashood A. Baderin & Manisuli Ssenyonjo, Development of
International Human Rights Law Before and After the UDHR, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAw: Six DECADES AFTER THE UDHR AND BEYOND 3 (Mashood A. Baderin & Manisuli Sseny-
onjo eds., 2010) [hereinafter Six DECADES] (compiling various works discussing UDHR's
impact on behavior).
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in 1998.4 The Organization of American States (OAS) created the
American Convention on Human Rights (American Convention)
in 1980, and that instrument established both the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights and Inter-American Commission.5 Africa
established the African Court of Human Rights and People's
Rights in 2006.6 The ECtHR has been at the forefront of regional
human rights protection; other international tribunals regularly
rely on its precedents as a basis for the interpretation of interna-
tional human rights law.7
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has played a similar
precedent-creating role for its region and international society. Its
greatest contribution to the inter-American system has been in
delegitimizing nondemocratic governments by means of con-
ducting monitoring during its on-site visits and presenting its coun-
try reports to the OAS political organs and to the hemispheric
public in general.8 These country reports have dominated the
agendas of the OAS General Assemblies for many years. The docu-
mentation presented by an intergovernmental organization of
human rights violations committed by states against their own
populations has a credibility not achieved by reports issued by non-
governmental organizations, and every state will fight not to be
censured by its peers.9 Professor Claudio Grossman concluded
"[t] he Inter-American system has contributed significantly to the
4. European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union pmbl.,
Dec. 7, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 8.
5. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights pmbl.,
Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention].
6. See Organization of African Unity, Protocol to the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights,
adoptedJune 9, 1998, OAU Doc. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III); MICHAEL L. PER
LIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND MENTAL DISABILITY LAw: CASES AND MATERI-
ALs 249-83 (2006); see also Olufemi Amao, The African Regional Human Rights System, in Six
DECADES, supra note 3, at 235, 235.
7. See Laurence R. Helfer, Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: Embedded-
ness as a Deep Structural Principle of the European Human Rights Regime, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 125,
133 (2008); Laurence R. Helfer & Erik Voeten, Do European Court ofHuman Rights judgments
Promote Legal and Policy Change? 2-3 (May 23, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3025&context=facultyschol-
arship. See generally Alastair Mowbray, The European Convention on Human Rights, in Six
DECADES, supra note 3, at 271.
8. See Christina Cerna, The Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights, 16
FLA. J. INT'L L. 195, 201 (2004); see also Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Inter-American Regional
Human Rights System, in Six DECADES, supra note 3, at 253, 264, 268-69.
9. Cerna, supra note 8, at 201; see also Alexandra Hunecus, Courts Resisting Courts:
Lessons from the Inter-American Court's Struggle to Enforce Human Rights, 44 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
493, 501 (2011); Lea Shaver, The Inter-American Human Rights System: An Effective Institution
for Regional Rights Protection?, 9 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 639, 665 (2010); Diego
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development of human rights in the region as well as to broader
democratic values."10
B. Disability Rights Cases Litigated in Regional Courts
and Commissions"
Several important cases litigated in existing interregional human
rights courts and commissions have had a tremendous impact on
the human rights for persons with disabilities. Not only do they
serve as an example for other nations to follow in assuring human
rights to every person, but these cases also demonstrate the effec-
tiveness of regional tribunals. One such case is In the Matter of Victor
Rosario Congo,12 involving a 48 year-old Ecuadorian man who, as a
result of the state's gross negligence and willful acts died of malnu-
trition, hydro-electrolitic imbalance, and heart and lung failure.13
Specifically, a guard beat Mr. Congo with a club on the scalp,
deprived him of medical treatment, kept him naked, and forced
him to endure complete isolation.14
The Inter-American Commission' 5 found that the state was
responsible for its agents conduct that violated Mr. Congo's right
to humane treatment under Article 5 of the American Conven-
tion.1 6 According to the Inter-American Commission, Article 5 of
the American Convention must be interpreted in light of the Prin-
ciples for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and for the
Improvement of Mental Health Care (MI Principles) 17 This is par-
Garcia-Saydn, The Inter-American Court and Constitutionalism in Latin-America, 89 TEX. L. REV.
1835, 1839 (2011).
10. Claudio Grossman, Latinos and Latinas at the Epicenter of Contemporary Discourses:
Gender and Human Rights: The Inter-American System: Challenges for the Future, 83 IND. L.J.
1267, 1282 (2008).
11. PERLIN, WHEN THE SILENCED ARE HEARD, supra note 2, at 46-57. On the
proliferation of international courts in general, see Alter, supra note 3.
12. Congo v. Ecuador, Case 11.427, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 63/99,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.95, doc. 7 %1 6-27 (1999) [hereinafter Matter of Congo].
13. Id.
14. Id. 9-10.
15. On the differences between the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, see Terrence Rogers, Using International
Human Rights Law to Combat Racial Discrimination in the U.S. Criminal justice System, 14
SCHOLAR 375, 432-35 (2011).
16. Matter of Congo, supra note 12, 9 59, 62, 68.
17. Id. 54. The Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and for
the Improvement of Mental Health Care are widely referred to as the "MI Principles." See
G.A. Res. 119, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/46/49, at 189-92
(Dec. 17, 1991). The MI Principles are the predecessor to the CRPD. Their publication
"inspired lawyers, advocates, professors and progressive mental health professionals to
begin thinking seriously about the intersection between international human rights law
2012] 5
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ticularly important because it makes the MI Principles "hard law,"
or in other words, binding upon the U.N. members who have
signed it.18 Thus, it guarantees more extensive rights for persons
with mental disabilities.
The Inter-American Commission found that the solitary confine-
ment of Mr. Congo constituted inhuman and degrading treatment
in violation of Article 5(2) of the American Convention, especially
in light of the fact he was left in isolation unable to satisfy his basic
needs.19 Thus, the state violated Mr. Congo's right to "be treated
with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person."20 Fur-
ther, the Inter-American Commission found that there is a duty
upon the state to ensure the physical, mental, and moral integrity
of persons suffering from mental illness.21
The Inter-American Commission further found that the state
had violated Article 4(1) of the American Convention because it
had failed to take measures in its power to ensure the right to life
of a person who, "partly because of his state of health and in part
owing to injuries inflicted on him by a State agent, was defenseless,
isolated and under its control."22 Under Article 25(1) of the Amer-
ican Convention, Mr. Congo had a right to judicial protection, a
right that the state violated because there were no judicial avenues
available to establish the responsibility for his sustained injuries
and death.23 As a result of this case, the Inter-American Commis-
and mental disability law." See Michael L. Perlin, "There Must Be Some Way Out of Here": Why
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Is Potentially the Best Weapon in the Fight
Against Sanism 4 (June 2004) [hereinafter Perlin, "There Must Be Some Way Out of Here]
(paper presented to conference at Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia, that was co-
sponsored by the Australasian Society for Intellectual Disability) (on file with author). But
see Tina Minkowitz, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and
the Right to be Free from Nonconsensual Psychiatric Interventions, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & Com.
405, 407 (2007) (criticizing the CRPD for not being sufficiently protective of the rights of
persons with psychosocial disabilities, especially in the context of the right to refuse treat-
ment); T.W. Harding, Human Rights Law in the Field of Mental Health: A Critical Review, 101
AcTA PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 24, 24 (2000) (discussing how the MI Principles are "basi-
cally flawed" and specifically referring to the right to refuse treatment). The MI Principles
retain significance today in those nations that have neither signed nor ratified the CRPD.
See PERLIN, WHEN THE SILENCED ARE HEARD, supra note 2, at 9-10 n.13.
18. On how soft law becomes hard law via court decisions, see Gerald L. Neuman,
Import, Export, and Regional Consent in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 19 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 101, 111 (2008); see also Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard Versus Soft Law
in International Security, 52 B.C. L. REv. 1147, 1165 (2011).
19. Matter of Congo, supra note 12, 1 59.
20. Id.
21. Id. 1 62.
22. Id. 84.
23. Id. 97; see also American Convention, supra note 5, art. 25(1).
[Vol. 446
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sion recommended that the state punish persons responsible for
the violations, compensate the family of Mr. Congo, provide medi-
cal and psychiatric care for persons suffering from mental illness,
and assign specialists to identify psychiatric disorders in individuals
confined to the penitentiary system. 2 4
In Purohit and Moore v. The Gambia,2 5 the African Commission2 6
found that Gambia violated various provisions of the African Char-
ter on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Charter).27 Although
the African Commission generally does not receive communica-
tions until local remedies are exhausted, the Commission found
that in this case, the existing remedies under Gambian law were
not realistic for persons with mental disabilities. 28
In determining the merits of Purohit and Moore, the African Com-
mission found that when states ratify the African Charter, they
undertake a responsibility to bring their domestic laws and practice
in conformity with the African Charter.29 In detailing the specific
violations, the African Commission found that Articles 2 and 3,
guaranteeing equal protection and anti-discrimination, are non-
derogable rights, meaning that a state party cannot, under any cir-
cumstances whatsoever, justify its non-compliance.30 The imple-
mentation of the Lunatic Detention Act (LDA) resulted in a higher
rate of detention of people from poor backgrounds and only pro-
vided legal assistance to those charged with capital offenses, and
thus violated the guaranteed rights of Articles 2 and 3.31
24. Matter of Congo, supra note 12, 1 98. On how Congo "[broke] new ground" in this
area of the law, see PERLIN, WHEN THE SILENCED ARE HEARD, supra note 2, at 12.
25. Purohit & Moore v. The Gambia, Afr. Comm'n on Hum. and Peoples' Rts.,
Comm. No. 241/2001, 1 85 (2003) (finding unlawful both the way that persons with
mental disabilities were treated in Gambia as well as prevailing sections of the Lunatic
Detention Act of Gambia).
26. In 1998, the Organization of African Unity adopted a protocol to the African
Charter that established an African Court on Human Rights to complement the work of
the preexisting African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. See Douglas Donoho,
Human Rights Enforcement in the Twenty-First Century, 35 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 19-20 n.54
(2006).
27. See Organization of African Unity, African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights, adoptedJune 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 [hereinafter
African Charter].
28. Purohit is praised as a "landmark case" in Mashood A. Baderin, Recent Developments
in the Affican Regional Human Rights System, 5 Hum. RTs. L. REv. 117, 137 (2005).
29. Purohit & Moore, Comm. No. 241/2001, 1 43.
30. Id. 49.
31. Id. 11 53-54.
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The African Commission further found that LDA violated Article
532 of the African Charter by classifying persons with mental disa-
bilities as "lunatics" and "idiots."33 Like the Inter-American Com-
mission, the African Commission turned to the MI Principles, and
concluded that the terms "lunatic" and "idiots" were dehumanizing
and deprived persons of the inherent right to human dignity in
violation of Article 5.34 In addition, the African Commission found
that the LDA violated Article 6 of the African Charter because the
LDA authorized detention on the basis of opinions by general
medical practitioners, did not have fixed periods of detention, and
did not provide for review or appeal.35 The African Commission
found that the right to health is crucial and persons with mental
disabilities, as a result of their condition and by virtue of their disa-
bilities, should be accorded special treatment to enable them to
sustain the optimum level of independence in accordance with
both the African Charter and MI Principles.3 6
Another success story of the effectiveness of the rights of persons
with mental disabilities arose in Paraguay in 2003. In this unre-
ported case, the Inter-American Commission granted immediate,
life-saving measures to protect the lives and physical, mental, and
moral integrity of 460 individuals detained in the state-run Neuro-
Psychiatric Hospital.37 Mental Disability Rights International
(MDRI) investigated the abuses in Paraguay's Neuro-Psychiatric
Hospital and documented the atrocious treatment and conditions
for all 460 people.38 The investigation included the cases of two
teenage boys, Julio and Jorge, who had been detained in "six-by-six
feet isolation cells, naked, and without access to bathrooms for
32. "Every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a
human being." African Charter, supra note 27, art. 5.
33. Purohit & Moore, Comm. No. 241/2001, 43.
34. Id. 59.
35. Id. 68.
36. Id. 81. But see Baderin, supra note 28, at 122 (alleging that state parties did not
implement the African Commission's recommendations); Frans Viljoen & Linette Louw,
State Compliance with the Recommendations of the African Commission on Human and Peoples'
Rights, 1994-2004, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 5 (2007); Frans Viljoen, State Compliance with the
Recommendations of the African Commission on Human Rights, in Six DECADES, supra note 3, at
411.
37. See Alison A. Hillman, Protecting Mental Disability Rights: A Success Story in the Inter-
American Human Rights System, Hum. RTs. BRIEF, Spring 2005, at 25-28 (describing the
case); TaraJ. Melish, Rethinking the "Less As More" Thesis: Supranational Litigation ofEconomic,
Social, and Cultural Rights in the Americas, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 171, 284-85 (2006).
For a discussion of the hospital conditions, see Perlin, The Universal Factors, supra note 2, at
345-46.
38. Paraguay, DISABILt rY RTs. INT'L, http://www.disabilityrightsintl.org/work/country-
projects/paraguay (last visited June 5, 2012).
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more than four years."3 The conditions were found to violate the
right to community integration, the right to life, the right to
humane treatment, the right to personal liberty, and the rights of
the child.40
As a result of this case, MDRI and Center forJustice and Interna-
tional Law (CEJIL) "worked through the [Inter-American] Com-
mission . . . to ensure that Paraguay develops a system of
community-based mental health" in order to prevent "such abuses
in the future."41 In late February 2005, MDRI and CEJIL signed a
groundbreaking agreement with the Paraguayan government
"requiring the state to develop a plan for deinstitutionalization and
creation of community-based mental health services, along with the
guarantees of funding for such a plan by Paraguay's President and
Minister of Health."4 2
Multiple cases litigated in Europe have had a significant impact
on mental disability rights. 4 3 In Winterwerp v. Netherlands, the
ECtHR found that in order to detain "persons of unsound mind"
in accordance with Article 5 of the European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Conven-
tion),44 there must be a diagnosis made using "objective medical
expertise" finding that the disorder required confinement.45 The
ECtHR also found that it is "essential that the person concerned
should have access to a court and the opportunity to be heard
either in person or, where necessary, through some form of repre-
sentation."4 6 In Herczegfalvy v. Austria, the ECtHR noted that the
position of inferiority and powerlessness typical of patients con-
fined to psychiatric hospitals calls for increased vigilance.4 7
Although ultimately the ECtHR did not find a violation of Article
3, which prohibits torture and inhuman treatment, it noted that
use of "handcuffs and security bed . .. appears worrying."48
Scholars are divided on the ultimate impact of the ECtHR's case
law on the population in question. Looking specifically at
Herczegfalvy, Professor David Hewitt has concluded that that the
39. Id.
40. Hillman, supra note 37, at 26.
41. Id. at 28.
42. Id.
43. See generally PERLIN ET AL., supra note 6, at 451-789 (describing the case law).
44. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art.
5, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention].
45. Winterwerp v. Netherlands, 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18 (1979).
46. Id. at 24.
47. Herczegfalvy v. Austria, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25-26 (1992).
48. Id. at 26.
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ECtHR has interpreted the European Convention "very restrictively
in psychiatric cases." 49 On the other hand, Professor Gerard
Quinn has concluded that the due process protections of the "neg-
ative right to liberty . . . are very robust under the Convention."5 0
The focus here is not on whether or not rights have been granted
to their fullest capacity, but rather, on whether there is an opportu-
nity to have a debate about those rights, and to consider the extent
to which human rights have been protected. In order to fully
explore the rights and rights violations of persons with mental disa-
bilities, there must first be a door open to uniformity and accounta-
bility. Only through litigation, particularly in regional tribunals,
and the resulting case law can we enter into an environment
geared towards further defining and enforcing human rights.5'
III. THE NEED FOR A DRTAP
A. The Absence of Such a Body in the Pacific
Asia and the Pacific have not established a regional human
rights court.5 2 Although there have been some historical attempts
to establish a regional human rights body in this region,5 3 no move-
49. David Hewitt, Do Human Rights Impact on Mental Health Law?, 151 NEW L.J. 1278,
1278 (2001).
50. Gerard Quinn, Civil Commitment and the Right to Treatment Under the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, 5 HARv. Hum. RTs. J. 1, 48 (1992). Professor Bruce Winick
bridges the gap between Hewitt and Quinn by arguing that, even in the absence of case
law, many of the ongoing "abusive practices" of commitment, treatment, and institutional
conditions still common in Eastern Europe "can be understood to violate the [European
Convention] and other evolving principles of international human rights law." Bruce
Winick, Therapeutic jurisprudence and the Treatment of People with Mental Illness in Eastern
Europe: Construing International Human Rights Law, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 537,
572 (2000).
51. On the salutary impact of such courts in another area of human rights (judgments
involving lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender issues), see Helfer & Voeten, supra note 7,
at 3-4 (concluding that European Court of Human Rights decisions "have a significant
and positive effect on the probability that lagging countries will adopt [rights-expanding]
reforms"). In contrast, others have concluded that the judicial process has not "served as a
full palliative for conditions in European communities and psychiatric institutions," refer-
ring to press coverage of institutions in Central and Eastern Europe in which "many people
with mental illnesses or disabilities are sequestered without rights or recourse under Com-
munist-era rules." PERLIN, WHEN THE SILENCED ARE HEARD, supra note 2, at 50.
52. See Tom Ginsburg, Eastphalia and Asian Regionalism, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 859, 860
(2011). On the irony of Asia's imperviousness to international human rights law in this
context, see Andrea Durbach et al., "A Tongue but No Teeth?" The Emergence of a Regional
Human Rights Mechanism in the Asia-Pacific, 31 SYDNEY L. REv. 211, 212 (2009) (citing Geral-
dine van Bueren, Why a Supermodel Is Still Such a Potent Symbol of Human Dignity and Libera-
tion, TIMES (Apr. 1, 2008), http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/law/article2210839.ece).
53. For a discussion of conferences and seminars held in the Asia and Pacific region
seeking to support expanded human rights protections, see Michael L. Perlin & Yoshikazu
2012] Promoting Social Change in Asia and the Pacific 11
ments in this field of law during the 1980s and 1990s achieved sig-
nificant success.5 4 By way of example, in 1985, the Law Association
for Asia and the Pacific proposed a Pacific Charter that would set
forth wide-ranging civil, political, social, and cultural rights, includ-
ing mechanisms for enforcing the Charter and dealing with com-
plaints of human rights violations.55 Unfortunately, this proposal
failed due to political, social, cultural, and practical pressures.56
Although ASEAN has adopted a Charter of ASEAN providing for
the establishment of a human rights body,57 critics have dismissed
Ikehara, Creation of a Disability Rights Tribunal for Asia and the Pacific: Its Impact on China?
(N.Y. Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10/11 #19, 2011) [hereinafter Perlin &
Ikehara, Creation of a Disability Rights Tribunal], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=1744196 (concluding that there were no movements in this field of
law during the 1980s and 1990s that achieved significant success in addressing the need for
a human rights body in this region). In 1985, the Law Association for Asia and the Pacific
proposed a Pacific Charter that would set forth wide-ranging civil, political, social, and
cultural rights. Patricia Hyndman, Report on a Proposed Pacific Charter of Human Rights Pre-
pared Under the Auspices of LA WASIA, May 1989, 22 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REv. 99, 99
(1992). The proposal included mechanisms for enforcing the Charter and dealing with
complaints of human rights violations. See id. at 100-01. Ultimately the proposal failed
due to political, social, cultural, and practical pressures. See P. ImranaJalal, Why Do We Need
a Pacific Human Rights Commission?, 40 VICTOIUA U. WELLINGTON L. REv. 177, 180-82
(2009).
54. Colm Campbell & Avril McDonald, Practice to Theory: States ofEmergency and Human
Rights Protection, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND ASIAN VALUES: CONTESTING NATIONAL IDENTITIES
AND CULTURAL REPRESENTATIONS IN ASIA 249, 270-71 (Michael Jacobsen & Ole Bruun eds.,
2006); Jalal, supra note 53, at 180-81. On the relationship between the development of
multilateral institutions in Asia and the Pacific and "identity building," see Amitav Acharya,
Ideas, Identity and Institution-Building: From the "ASEAN Way " to the "Asia-Pacific Way ", 10 PAC.
REv. 319 (1997).
55. Hyndman, supra note 53, at 99-101; see alsoJalal, supra note 53, at 180-81.
56. Hyndman, supra note 53, at 171-72; see alsojalal, supra note 53, at 181-82.
57. Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations art. 14, Nov. 20, 2007, avail-
able at www.aseansec.org/21069.pdf; see also David Cohen, ASEAN's Intergovernmental Com-
mission on Human Rights and Civil Society Initiatives in Southeast Asia, ASIA PAC. BULL., Mar. 1,
2010, at 1. On the creation of ASEAN, see Lin Chun Hung, ASEAN Charter: Deeper Regional
Integration Under International Law?, 9 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 821 (2010). On ASEAN in gen-
eral, see Yasumasa Komori, Asia's International Creation and Evolution, 33 ASIAN PERSP. 151,
179 (2009) (discussing how ASEAN countries continue to play a central role in institu-
tional relationships among Southeast Asian state); Richard Stubbs, ASEAN Plus Three:
Emerging East Asian Regionalism?, 42 ASIAN SURv. 440, 455 (2002) (examining the ASEAN
plus three framework and arguing that it will remain a significant regional actor); Alan
Collins, A People-Oriented ASEAN: A Door Ajar or Closed for Civil Society Organizations?, 30 CON-
TEMP. SE. ASIA 313 (2008); Edi Suharto, Social Protection Systems in ASEAN: Social Policy in a
Comparative Analysis, 31 Soc. DEV. ISSUES 1 (2009); Simon S.C. Tay, The ASEAN Charter:
Between National Sovereignty and the Region's Constitutional Moment, 12 SING. Y.B. INT'L L. 151,
169 (2008). For a historical perspective on ASEAN, see Lee Leviter, The ASEAN Charter:
ASEAN Failure or Member Failure?, 43 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 159 (2010).
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the mandate as merely an "aspiration,"58 and "toothless,"59 and
have characterized ASEAN as reflecting a "frustrated regionalism"
or a "reactionary regionalism."6 0 These ASEAN shortcomings have
made the failure to create a court or commission in Asia harmful
to social justice in multiple ways,6' including the failures of
"authoritarian regime[s]" to be "adequately responsive to diverse
developmental concerns."6 2  There are significant gaps between
domestic law in the nations of Asia and the Pacific and interna-
tional law, as reflected in the region's ineffective-often non-exis-
tent-implementation of the CRPD. The creation of a DRTAP
would be the most important and effective way to remediate this
gap.63
58. Tamio Nakamura, Proposal of the Draft Charter of the East Asian Community: An Over-
view and the Basic Principles, in EAST ASIAN REGIONALISM FROM A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE: CUR-
RENT FEATURES AND A VISION FOR THE FUTURE 193, 204 (Tamio Nakamura ed., 2009).
59. Ginsburg, supra note 52, at 32; see also Shaun Narine, ASEAN and the ARF: The
Limits of the "ASEAN Way", 37 ASIAN SURV. 961, 977 (1997) (discussing how ASEAN bypasses
conflict). For a more optimistic response, see Diane Desierto, ASEAN's Constitutionalization
of International Law: Challenges to Evolution Under the New ASEAN Charter, 49 COLUM. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 268, 319 (2011) (noting that the "constitutionalization" of international law "has a
revolutionary potential for enriching the rule of law across all of Southeast Asia's diverse
politics"). On the distinctive features of constitutionalism in East Asia in general, see
Jiunn-Rong Yeh & Wen-Chen Chang, The Emergence of East Asian Constitutionalism: Features
in Comparison, 59 AM. J. Comp. L. 805, 839 (2011). On the frustrations of creating regional-
ist projects in Asia and the Pacific, see Deepak Nair, Regionalism in the Asia Pacific/East Asia:
A Frustrated Regionalism?, 31 CONTEMP. SE. ASIA 110 (2008). On whether the current time is
this region's "constitutional moment," see Tay, supra note 57.
60. Mark Beeson, ASEAN Plus Three and the Rise ofReactionary Regionalism, 25 CONTEMP.
SE. ASIA 251, 256-57 (2003); see also Nair, supra note 59, at 208-09.
61. See Michael C. Davis, The Political Economy and Culture of Human Rights in East Asia,
1 JINDAL J. INT'L AFF. 48, 50 (2011) (explaining how East Asia would benefit from the
development of regional and national human rights institutions); Andrew Byrnes et al.,
Joining the Club: The Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions, the Paris Pinci-
ples, and the Advancement of Human Rights Protection in the Region, 14 AUSTL. J. Hum. RTs. 63
(2008) (examining the role of national human rights institution in this region in general);
Shaun Narine, ASEAN and the Management of Regional Security, 71 PAC. AFF. 195, 213 (1998)
(relating ASEAN's failure to develop a sense of regional interest).
62. Davis, supra note 61, at 72; see also id. at 50 ("I believe it is precisely this strengthen-
ing of the domestic human rights debate fostered under East Asian conditions that offers
something of interest to a world trying to deal with human rights concerns in many devel-
opmental contexts.").
63. See infra Part III.
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B. Lack of Comprehensive Domestic Legislation in Asian and
Pacific Nations
There is no comprehensive disability law that mandates non-dis-
crimination principle in many countries in this region,64 and "rela-
tively few" nations have "extensive and well-documented
experience of the operation of disability discrimination legisla-
tion."65  Only seven governments in the region reported to the
U.N. Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
(UNESCAP) that they have anti-discrimination laws. 66 Unfortu-
nately, some of these laws, in particular the Japanese law, are
neither comprehensive nor effective .67
Thirty-one out of thirty-six governments surveyed by UNESCAP
offer some definition of "disability" in their laws. 6 8 Several nations,
however, include definitions that are flatly rejected by the CRPD,
including those implemented in Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, and
China, all of which define disability as an "abnormality."6 9 At least
nine governments use a medical model defining disability as attrib-
uted to one's impairment, in direct violation of the CRPD, which
firmly endorses a social model definition. 70 Only two nations in
64. See Yoshikazu Ikehara, What Is the DRTAP Project and Its Future? 11-17 (Oct. 22,
2010) (paper presented to the International Conference on Disability Rights Tribunal in
Asia & the Pacific, Bangkok, Thailand), available at http://tokyo-advocacy.com/drtapeng/
conference -bangkok.html (discussing all statutes); U.N. ECON. & Soc. COMM'N FOR ASIA &
THE PACIFIc (UNESCAP), DISABILITY AT A GLANCE 2010, U.N. Doc. ST/ESCAP/2583 (2010)
(hereinafter ESCAP, DISABILITY AT A GLANCE 2010). On the "paucity" of constitutional
protections currently in place in this region in this context, see Christine Ricci et al., A
Review of the Legislative Mechanisms Available to Protect the Social Participation Rights of People
with Depression in the Asia Pacific Region, 12 AUSTRALASIAN PSYCHIATRY S16, S26 (2004).
65. Andrew Byrnes, Disability Discrimination Law and the Asian and Pacific Region 1 24
(UNESCAP, Working Paper No. 3, 2011), available at http://www.unescap.org/sdd/issues/
disability/crpd/files/Paper-III-Andrew-201 1 0 1 2 1 .pdf.
66. UNESCAP, DISABILITY AT A GLANCE 2010, supra note 64, at 16. The seven govern-
ments are Australia, Azerbaijan, Hong Kong, India, Japan, the Philippines, and the Repub-
lic of Korea. Id.
67. In employment law, Japan focuses on the special considerations owed to persons
with disabilities, rather than outlawing employment discrimination per se. See Cerise
Fritsch, Right to Work? A Comparative Look at China and Japan's Labor Rights for Disabled Per-
sons, 6 LOYOLA U. CHI. INT'L L. REv. 403, 417 (2009). It also only focuses on persons with
physical disabilities and does not address persons with mental disabilities. Id. at 416-18.
TheJapanese law does not stipulate any procedure for dealing with complaints of failure to
observe these rights, and it is not clear whether individual complaints can be brought
under the legislation. See Byrnes, supra note 65, 1 47.
68. UNESCAP, DISABILITY AT A GLANCE 2010, supra note 64, at 12.
69. Id.
70. See Michael L. Perlin, "Abandoned Love": The Impact of Wyatt v. Stickney on the Inter-
section Between International Human Rights and Domestic Mental Disability Law, 35 LAv &
PSYCHOL. REv. 121, 139 (2011) [hereinafter Perlin, "Abandoned Lovel; see alsoJane Zhi,
Living, Acting, and Experiencing Otherwise Than We Do: Rethinking China's Laws on the Protection
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Asia-Malaysia and Thailand-define disability from the social
model perspective. 7'
Several governments fail to adequately define operative terms,
and, in direct violation of the CRPD, exclude certain disabilities
from protection of the law.72 For example, Bangladesh's definition
does not include persons with autism,73 and often, definitions are
unclear as to whether "mental disabilities" includes persons with
developmental disabilities and psycho-social disabilities. Mongolia,
for instance, uses the phrase "mental problems,"74 while Azerbaijan
refers to mental "abnormalities,"7 5 neither of which coherently
defines the cohort of individuals about whom the statutes are pur-
portedly written."76 The Indian definition is a closed list that
excludes many disabilities, such as epilepsy and autism.77 In this
region, only Malaysia has a definition that echoes the expansive
language of the CRPD.78
Definitions of discrimination are unclear and inconsistent in this
region. For example, the Fijian Constitution prohibits discrimina-
tion on the basis of disability, but there are no laws that actually
define what constitutes "discrimination."7 9 Similarly, in the Philip-
pines and Turkmenistan, comprehensive laws prohibit discrimina-
of Persons with Disabilities, 20 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 279, 292-94 (2011)
(describing why and how China, a country that has ratified the CRPD, needs to shift from a
medical model to a social model).
71. See Byrnes, supra note 65, 43.
72. CRPD, supra note 1, pmbl.
73. Country Profile: Bangladesh, ASIA-PAc. DEV. CENTER ON DISABILITY, http://www.apcd
foundation.org/?q=content/bangladesh (last visited June 5, 2012). The Bangladeshi law
also provides no explicit guarantee that persons who acquire a disability while employed
are protected against discrimination on the basis of that disability. Byrnes, supra note 65,
43.
74. Country Profile Mongolia, ASIA-PAC. DEV. CENTER ON DISABILITY, http://www.apcd
foundation.org/?q=content/mongolia (last visited June 5, 2012).
75. Ikehara, supra note 64.
76. See UNESCAP, STUDY ON NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK ON DISABILITY AND ITS
HARMONIZATION WITH THE UNCRPD IN TURKMENISTAN 27-28 (2009); Country Profile: Philip-
pines, ASIA-PAc. DEV. CENTER ON DISABILITY, http://www.apcdfoundation.org/?q=content/
philippines (last visited June 5, 2012).
77. See, e.g., Byrnes, supra note 65, 11 87-88.
78. See id. 1 82; Persons with Disabilities Act, Laws of Malaysia, Act 685, § 2 (2008)
("[P]ersons with disabilities' include those who have long term physical, mental, intellec-
tual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full
and effective participation in society.").
79. Theresia Degener & Gerard Quinn, A Survey of International, Comparative and
Regional Disability Law Reform, in DISABILITY RIGHTS LAW AND POLICY- INTERNATIONAL AND
NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 3 (Mary Lou Breslin & Silvia Yee eds., 2002).
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tion against persons with disabilities, but fail to define
"discrimination."8 0
Many nations' laws are inconsistent with other CRPD require-
ments. In Korea, for example, the broadcasting law does not
require sign language interpretation as required by the CRPD,8 '
and Korea's family health law gives priority to the institutionaliza-
tion of persons with disabilities. 8 2 Cambodia's Marriage and Fam-
ily Law forbids certain persons with disabilities from marrying, such
as impotent men and persons who have leprosy, tuberculosis, can-
cer, or venereal disease, as well as persons with mental defects. 3
Even in many nations in the region that have domestic disability
laws, there is no cause of action that would allow a person with a
disability to file a claim to resolve a grievance.84
The Hong Kong government demonstrated its unwillingness to
comply with the CRPD in a case in which an applicant was lawfully
rejected for a public job due to her relation to a person with
mental illness, on the theory that "such applicants cannot be
trusted to perform the job safely."85 These examples clearly show
that most individual Asian nations do not willingly comply with the
CRPD.8 6
80. Id. at 4.
81. See CRPD, supra note 1, art. 9, § 2(e) ("States Parties shall also take appropriate
measures to . . . [p]rovide forms of live assistance and intermediaries, including guides,
readers and professional sign language interpreters, to facilitate accessibility to buildings
and other facilities open to the public . . . .").
82. Michael L. Perlin & Yoshikazu Ikehara, Promoting Social Change in East Asia: The
Movement to Create a Disability Rights Tribunal and the Promise of International Online, Distance
Learning 8-9 (N.Y. Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10/11 #17, Jan. 20, 2011)
[hereinafter Perlin & Ikehara, Promoting Social Change], available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1743741. Contrarily, Article 19 of the CRPD commands that "States Parties to this
Convention recognize the equal right of all persons with disabilities to live in the commu-
nity, with choices equal to others, and shall take effective and appropriate measures to
facilitate full enjoyment by persons with disabilities of this right and their full inclusion and
participation in the community." CRPD, supra note 1, art. 19.
83. Ulrike Buschbacher Connelly, Disability Rights in Cambodia: Using the Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to Expose Human Rights Violations, 18 PAC. RIM L. & PO'Y
J. 123, 136 (2009).
84. See Byrnes, supra note 65, 1 50 (discussing Laos).
85. K, Y, & W v. Secretary for Justice, H.KC. 796 (2000); see also Carole J. Petersen,
From British Colony to Special Administrative Region of China: Embracing Human Rights in Hong
Kong, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN AsIA: A COMPARATIVE LEA.L STUDY OF TWELVE AsiAN JURsDIC-
TIONS, FRANCE AND THE USA 224, 249 (R. Peerenboom et al. eds., 2006).
86. Perlin & Ikehara, Promoting Social Change, supra note 82, at 9; see also Emilie
Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox ofEmpty
Promises, 110 AM. J. Soc. 1373, 1373 (2005) (explaining that the acceptance of human
rights doctrine and conventions leads to an emergent global legitimacy of human rights
that "exerts independent global civil society effects that improve states' actual human
rights practices").
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C. The "Asian Values" Debate
The Asian values debate8 7 is a form of cultural relativism.88 Cul-
tural relativism, however, should not and cannot be used as a
defense in ignoring human rights. Cultural relativism is not suffi-
cient justification for the denial of the universal application of
human rights standards.89 There is a difference between "adhering
less to some global standard of human rights in order to promote
overall human rights in socioeconomic realms and not adhering to
certain rights because of a lack of political will or hiding behind
the mask of cultural relativism."90 As Arati Rao has stated, "the
notion of culture favored by international actors must be
unmasked for what it is: a falsely rigid, ahistorical, selectively cho-
sen set of self-justificatory texts and practices whose patent partial-
ity raises the question of exactly whose interests are being served
and who comes out on top."91 While it is important to take cultural
differences into consideration when involved in international rela-
87. See Michael L. Perlin, Why a Regional Tribunal Is Needed to Implement the CRPD (N.Y.
Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10/11 #18, Jan. 20, 2011) [hereinafter Perlin,
Why a Regional Tribunal Is Needed], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1744157; PERLIN,
WHEN THE SILENCED ARE HEARD, supra note 2, at 174-80. See generally Christian Tomuschat,
Asia and International Law - Common Ground and Regional Diversity, 1 ASIAN J. INT'L L. 217
(2011) (discussing Asian and international law in general); Teemu Ruskola, Where Is Asia?
When Is Asia? Theorizing Comparative Law and International Law, 44 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 879,
885-89 (2011) (discussing attempts to define Asia for these purposes).
88. Cultural relativism has been defined as an approach to rights which "posits that
culture is the source of validity of rules and that, since cultures vary, rules that are valid
within one culture will not necessarily be valid in others." Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Universal
Versus Islamic Human Rights: A Clash of Cultures or a Clash with a Construct?, 15 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 307, 382 (1994).
89. See Patrick T.C. Hui, Birth Control in China: Cultural, Gender, Socio-economic and Legis-
lative Perspectives in Light of CEDAWStandards, 32 H.K. L.J. 187, 199 (2002); see alsoJoel Paul,
Cultural Resistance to Global Governance, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 13 n.51 (2000) (citing
Michael C. Davis, Constitutionalism and Political Culture: The Debate over Human Rights and
Asian Values, 11 HARv. Hum. RTs.J. 109 (1998) (criticizing cultural relativism as determinis-
tic and tautological)); Simon S.C. Tay, Human Rights, Culture and the Singapore Example, 41
McGILL L.J. 743 (1996) (examining the problematic character of the cultural argument in
the context of Asian human rights).
90. Mahmood Monshipouri, Promoting Universal Human Rights: Dilemmas of Integrating
Developing Countries, 4 YALE Hum. RTs. & DEV. L.J. 25, 25-26 (2001).
91. Arati Rao, The Politics of Gender and Culture in International Human Rights Discourse,
in WOMEN'S RIGHTS HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVEs 167, 174 (Julie
Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995); see also Ann-Belinda S. Preis, Human Rights as Cultural
Practice: An Anthropological Critique, 18 Hum. RTs. Q. 286, 289 (1995) (examining and
rejecting cultural relativism from an anthropological perspective); Man Yee Karen Lee,
Universal Human Dignity: Some Reflections in the Asian Context, 3 ASIAN J. COMP. L. 1, 1-2, 31
(2008) (discussing cultural perspectives in this inquiry).
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tions, in practice, cultural relativism rarely is a sincere call for
tolerance.92
The Asian values debate began in the early 1990s with challenges
from several of the states themselves-in particular Singapore,
Malaysia, and Indonesia-arguing against the application of inter-
national human rights law because it is based in Western values,
and thus, does not conform to Asian culture.93 As used in this con-
text, Asian values generally refers to Confucianism and concepts
such as respecting elders, preserving social order, maintaining
social harmony, enhancing group orientation, and fostering the
collective interests of the society and state.94 "The implication is
that not to share these values is to be less than 'Asian,' to have lost
one's bearings and to become 'Westernized."' 9 5
Proponents of the Asian values position overcoming interna-
tional human rights obligations "argue that if 'Western' human
rights treaties are respected in a given situation, the public will be
worse off-thrown into civil war, vulnerable to insurgents, or, alter-
natively, unable to engage in the practices they value."96 In other
words, adhering to human rights obligations interferes with the
government's welfare-promoting activities, and these welfare-pro-
moting activities should take precedence.9 7 "Many Asian countries,
in justifying their claim that economic rights are more important
than political rights, argue that at different stages of a country's
92. See Robert D. Sloane, Outrelativizing Relativism: A Liberal Defense of the Universality of
International Human Rights, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 527, 545 (2001).
93. Karen Engle, Culture and Human Rights: The Asian Values Debate in Context, 32
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 291, 331 (2000). On self-imposed limitations on constitutional
construction in Malaysia and Singapore, see Li-ann Thio, Beyond the "Four Walls"in an Age of
TransnationalJudicial Conversations: Civil Liberties, Rights Theories, and Constitutional Adjudica-
tion in Malaysia and Singapore, 19 COLUM.J. ASIAN L. 428 (2006). On the potential role of a
national human rights commission in Malaysia, see Li-ann Thio, Panacea, Placebo, or Pawn?
The Teething Problems of the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (Suhakam), 40 GEO. WASH.
INT'L L. REV. 1271 (2009).
94. See Same Varayudej, Right to Democracy in International Law: Its Implications for Asia,
12 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 13 (2006); see also Stephen L. McPherson, Crossing the
River by Feeling the Stones: The Path to Judicial Independence in China, 26 PENN ST. INT'L L. REv.
787, 791-92 (2008) (discussing the significance of group orientation in this context).
95. Tay, supra note 89, at 764. But see Tomuschat, supra note 87, at 230 ("From the
very outset, the assumption that human rights was a Western concept was erroneous.");
Christian Tomuschat, Human Rights in a World-Wide Framework: Some Current Issues, 45 HEI-
DELBERG J. INT'L L. 547, 550 (1985); CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, HUMAN RIGHTS: BETWEEN IDE-
ALISM AND REALISM 85 (2d ed. 2008).
96. Eric A. Posner, Human Welfare, Not Human Rights, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 1758, 1771
(2008).
97. Id.
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development, it is necessary to focus on different rights."98 In addi-
tion, many Asian governments complain "vehemently that interna-
tional human rights should not be an excuse for strong-arm
politics and interference in the domestic affairs of a country."99
Some scholars argue that the Asian values debate should not be
interpreted as a philosophical debate about the universality of
human rights. 00 Rather, the better interpretation is that "virtually
all governments concede that they have a 'universal' obligation to
advance the welfare of their populations, but, given local condi-
tions and traditions, they cannot advance the welfare of their popu-
lations if they are constrained by human rights treaties."' 0 '
Regardless of how the Asian values debate is interpreted, the crux
of the argument is whether Asian values really do exist and if so,
whether they can be an excuse to observing universal human
rights.
The Asian values debate leads to false consciousness because it
presumes a unified and homogenous multi-generational attitude
towards a bundle of social, cultural, and political issues. 02 The
Asian values argument fails to account for "the richness of values
discourse" in Asia.' 03 For this reason, some argue that there is no
such thing as an Asian value.' 04 Further, assuming that there are
uniform Asian values leads to generalizations and stereotypes of
what is "Asian." 05 One such generalization is that Asian countries
favor the community over the individual. Opponents of the Asian
values debate question whether Asian governments are really inter-
ested in promoting development of communities over that of indi-
98. Richard Klein, Cultural Relativism, Economic Development and International Human
Rights in the Asian Context, 9 ToURO INT'L L. REV. 1, 31 (2001).
99. Randall Peerenboom, Beyond Universalism and Relativism: The Evolving Debates About
"Values in Asia", 14 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 41 (2003).
100. See id. at 2-5; Ruskola, supra note 87, at 885-89.
101. Posner, supra note 96, at 1771.
102. On the other hand, some opponents of the "Asian values" argument are guilty of
constructing an overly unified and idealized West. See Peerenboom, supra note 99, at 1
(arguing that the Asian values debate is no longer fruitful).
103. Davis, supra note 89, at 147.
104. Engle, supra note 93, at 313.
105. Tay, supra note 89, at 758. On ways that Buddhist thought is universalist and fully
consonant with expanded human rights as "an integral part of the spiritual tradition of
Asia," see Menachem Mautner, From "Honor" to "Dignity": How Should a Liberal State Treat
Non-Liberal Cultural Groups?, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 609, 628 (2008). See generally Shiv
Narayan Persaud, Eternal Law: The Underpinnings of Dharma and Karma in the justice System,
13 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INr. 49 (2009) (discussing the compatibility of Hindu thought and
practice with universal human rights); Fait A. Muedini, Examining Islam and Human Rights
from the Perspective ofSufism, 7 MUSLIM WORLDJ. Hum. RTs. 1 (2010) (discussing the compat-
ibility of the mystical tradition of Sufism within Islam and human rights).
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viduals."o6  The broad state sovereignty claims of Asian
governments are undermined given the "increasing reach of inter-
national law and the participation of all countries in the interna-
tional legal order."10 7 In addition, the Asian values debate assumes
that culture is static, rather than varying from generation to
generation.ios
In contrast to cultural relativism is the universalist position,
which consists of two main variants: extreme moral universalism
and moderate moral universalism.' 09 Extreme moral universalism
is the concept that moral issues do not depend on culture or the
views of any group or individual." 0 Moderate moral universalism
holds that "culture is irrelevant to the correctness of some, but not
necessarily all, issues."'I "Both variants underscore the impor-
tance of basic human rights that must be universally applied irre-
spective of cultural differences."' 12
The universality of human rights must predominate. Rosalyn
Higgins aptly summarized as follows:
Individuals everywhere want the same essential things: to have
sufficient food and shelter; to be able to speak freely; to practice
their own religion or to abstain from religious belief; to feel that
their person is not threatened by the state; to know that they will
not be tortured, or detained without charge, and that, if
charged, they will have a fair trial. ' 
To deny persons with mental disabilities these basic human
rights on the basis of Asian values is an attempt to hide behind the
mask of cultural relativism.114
106. Compare Peerenboom, supra note 99, at 39, with Ginsburg, supra note 52, at 868
("[T] here is no region-wide notion of law as a superior regulatory device in East Asia.").
107. See id. at 41.
108. See Tay, supra note 89, at 759.
109. See Peerenboom, supra note 99, at 12.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. PERLIN, WHEN THE SILENCED ARE HEARD, supra note 2, at 179; see also Talal A. Al-
Emadi & Maryam A. Asmakh, Cultural Differences and Their Impact, 5 CHINESEJ. INT'L L. 807,
810 (2006) ("The analysis of the impact of culture should move beyond the relatively sim-
plistic categorization of Eastern, Asian or Western countries.").
113. ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE USE
IT 97 (1994).
114. See generally Albert H.Y. Chen, Pathways of Western Liberal Constitutional Development
in Asia: A Comparative Study ofFive Major Nations, 8 INT'LJ. CONST. L. 849 (2010) (discussing
the role of western constitutionalism in Asia); Li-Ann Thio, Soft Constitutional Law in Non-
liberal Asian Constitutional Democracies, 8 INT'lJ. CONST. L. 766 (2010) (discussing the role of
"soft" constitutional law); Desierto, supra note 59, at 273-74 (discussing how a turn to
constitutionalism might positively affect "the trajectory of ASEAN's institutional and nor-
mative development as a regional organization."). For a recent, thoughtful piece rejecting
the notion that there are Asian values demanding a separate intellectual property corpus
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IV. THE U.N. CONVENTION
Disability rights have taken center stage at the United Nations
with the drafting and adoption of a binding international disability
rights convention, the most significant historical development to
date in the recognition of the human rights of persons with mental
disabilities." 5 In late 2001, the U.N. General Assembly established
an ad hoc committee "to consider proposals for a comprehensive
and integral international convention to promote and protect the
rights and dignity of persons with disabilities . . "116 The ad hoc
committee drafted a document over the course of five years and
eight sessions, and the U.N. General Assembly adopted the new
CRPD in December 2006 and opened it for signature in March
2007.117 It entered into force, and thus became legally binding on
states parties, on May 3, 2008, thirty days after the twentieth ratifi-
cation."I One of the hallmarks of the process that led to the publi-
cation of the CRPD was the participation of persons with
disabilities and the clarion cry, "nothing about us, without us.""'
of law, see Peter K Yu, Intellectual Property and Asian Values, 16 MARQ. INTELL. PROr. L. Riv.
101, 112-22 (2012).
115. On the singular role of this Convention, see, e.g., PERLIN, WHEN THE SILENCED ARE
HEARD, supra note 2, at 143-58; Fr6d6ric M6gret, The Disabilities Convention: Toward a Holis-
tic Concept of Rights, 12 INT'LJ. HUM. RTs. 261, 274-75 (2008); Fr6d6ric M6gret, The Disabili-
ties Convention: Human Rights of Persons with Disabilities or Disability Rights?, 30 Hum. RTs. Q.
494, 514-15 (2008) [hereinafter M6gret, Disability Rights]; Michael L. Perlin & Eva Szeli,
Mental Health Law and Human Rights: Evolution and Contemporary Challenges, in MENTAL
HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS 94, 99-100 (Michael Dudley ed., forthcoming 2012) [herein-
after Perlin & Szeli, Evolution and Contemporary Challenges]; Michael L. Perlin & Eva Szeli,
Mental Health Law and Human Rights: Evolution, Challenges and the Promise of the New Conven-
tion, in UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES: MUL-
TIIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECrIVES 241, 248 (Jukka Kumpuvuori & Martin Scheninen eds., 2010)
[hereinafter Perlin & Szeli, Promise]. On the impact of U.N. human rights treaties on
domestic law generally, see Christof Heyns & Frans Viljoen, The Impact of the United Nations
Human Rights Treaties on the Domestic Level, 23 Hum. RTs. Q. 483, 487-88 (2001) (noting that
United Nations human rights treaties are most effective when treaty norms are spontane-
ously made out of domestic law).
116. G.A. Res. 56/168, 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/168 (Feb. 26, 2002).
117. See G.A. Res. 61/106, 1 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106 (Jan. 24, 2007).
118. Press Release, Officer of the High Commission for Human Rights, With 20 Ratifi-
cations, Landmark Disability Treaty Set to Enter into Force on 3 May, U.N. Press Release
HR/4941 (Apr. 3, 2008); see also Tara Melish, The UN Disability Convention: Historic Process,
Strong Prospects, and Why the U.S. Should Ratify, 14 HuM. RTs. BiuEF 37, 44 (2007); Michael
Ashley Stein & Penelope J.S. Stein, Beyond Disability Civil Rights, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1203
(2007). As of the time of the completion of this Article, 153 states have signed and 113
have ratified the Convention, while 90 countries have signed and 65 have ratified the
Optional Protocol. See Work of the United Nations for People with Disabilities, U.N.
ENABLE, http://www.un.org/disabilities (last visited June 5, 2012).
119. Rosemary Kayess & Phillip French, Out of Darkness into Light? Introducing the Con-
vention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 8 Hum. RTs. L. REv. 1, 4 n.15 (2008).
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This has led commentators to conclude that the CRPD "is regarded
as having finally empowered the 'world's largest minority' to claim
their rights, and to participate in international and national affairs
on an equal basis with others who have achieved specific treaty rec-
ognition and protection."12 0
The CRPD is the most revolutionary international human rights
document applying to persons with disabilities ever created.' 2 '
The CRPD furthers the human rights approach to disability and
recognizes the right of people with disabilities to equality in most
every aspect of life.122 It firmly endorses a social model of disability
in a clear and direct repudiation of the medical model that tradi-
tionally was part-and-parcel of mental disability law.123 It furthers
the human rights approach to disability and recognizes the right of
people with disabilities to equality in most aspects of life. "The
[CRPD] responds to traditional models and situates disability
within a social model framework and sketches the full range of
human rights that apply to all human beings, all with a particular
application to the lives of persons with disabilities." 2 4 It provides a
framework for insuring that mental health laws "fully recognize the
rights of those with mental illnesses."1 25
The CRPD categorically affirms the social model of disability 26
by describing it as a condition arising from "interaction with vari-
ous barriers [that] may hinder their full and effective participation
120. Id. at 4.
121. See Perlin & Szeli, Evolution and Contemporary Challenges, supra note 115, at 99; PER-
IN, WHEN THE SILENCED ARE HEARD, supra note 2, at 3-21. See generally Michael L. Perlin, "A
Change Is Gonna Come": The Implications of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities for the Domestic Practice of Constitutional Mental Disability Law, 29 N. ILL. U. L.
REV. 483 (2009).
122. See Aaron Dhir, Human Rights Treaty Drafting Through the Lens of Mental Disability:
The Proposed International Convention on Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of
Persons with Disabilities, 41 STAN. J. INT'L L. 181, 182 (2005).
123. See Perlin, "Abandoned Love", supra note 70, at 139.
124. Janet E. Lord & Michael A. Stein, Social Rights and the Relational Value of the Rights to
Participate in Sport, Recreation, and Play, 27 B.U. INT'L L.J. 249, 256 (2009); see also Ronald
McCallum, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Some Reflec-
tions (Sydney Law Sch., Research Paper No. 10/30, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1563883. For more on the social model framework, see Janet E. Lord et al., Les-
sons from the Experience of U.N. Convention on the Rights ofPersons with Disabilities: Addressing the
Democratic Deficit in Global Health Governance, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHIcs 564 (2010); H. Archi-
bald Kaiser, Canadian Mental Health Law: The Slow Process of Redirecting the Ship of State, 17
HEALTH L.J. 139 (2009).
125. Bernadette McSherry, International Trends in Mental Health Laws: Introduction, in
INTERNATIONAL TRENDS IN MENTAI HEALTH LAWS 1, 8 (Bernadette McSherry ed., 2008).
126. See Lord et al., supra note 125, at 568; Kaiser, supra note 124, at 164; Perlin, "There
Must Be Some Way Out of Here", supra note 17, at 6-7; Michael L. Perlin, "There's Voices in the
Night Trying to Be Heard": The Potential Impact of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
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in society on an equal basis with others" instead of inherent limita-
tions,'27 re-conceptualizing mental health rights as disability
rights,128 and extending existing human rights law to take into
account the specific rights experiences of persons with disabili-
ties.'2 " To this end, the CRPD calls for "respect for inherent dig-
nity"'" and "non-discrimination."'3 ' Subsequent articles declare
"freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment,"S 2 "freedom from exploitation, violence and
abuse,"' 33 and a right to protection of the "integrity of the
person." 34
The CRPD is unique because it is the first legally binding instru-
ment devoted to the comprehensive protection of the rights of per-
sons with disabilities. It not only clarifies that states may not
discriminate against persons with disabilities, but also sets out
explicitly the many steps that states must take to create an enabling
environment so that persons with disabilities can enjoy authentic
equality in society.'35 One of the most critical issues in seeking to
bring life to international human rights law in a mental disability
law context is the right to adequate and dedicated counsel. The
CRPD mandates that "States Parties shall take appropriate mea-
sures to provide access by persons with disabilities to the support
they may require in exercising their legal capacity."' 36 Elsewhere,
the CRPD commands as follows:
Disabilities on Domestic Mental Disability Law, in EvOLVING ISSUES IN DISCRIMINATION: SOCIAL
SCIENCE AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 8 (R. Wiener ed., forthcoming 2012).
127. CRPD, supra note 1, pmbl. (e), art. 1.
128. Phil Fennel, Human Rights, Bioethics, and Mental Disorder, 27 MED. & L. 95, 95
(2008).
129. M6gret, Disability Rights, supra note 115, at 268; see PERLIN, WHEN THE SILENCED ARE
HEARD, supra note 2, at 143-58.
130. CRPD, supra note 1, art. 3(a).
131. Id. art. 3(b).
132. Id. art. 15.
133. Id. art. 16.
134. Id. art. 17.
135. On the changes that ratifying states need to make in their domestic involuntary
civil commitment laws, see Bryan Y. Lee, The U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities and Its Impact upon Involuntary Civil Commitment of Individuals with Developmental
Disabilities, 44 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROns. 393, 414-16 (2011); see also Istvin Hoffman &
Gybrgy K6nczei, Legal Regulations Related to the Passive and Active Legal Capacity of Persons with
Intellectual and Psychosocial Disabilities in Light of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities and the Impending Reform of the Hungarian Civil Code, 33 Lov. L.A. INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 143, 151 (2010) (discussing the application of the CRPD to capacity issues).
136. See Michael L. Perlin, I Might Need a Good Lawyer, Could Be Your Funeral, My Trial: A
Global Perspective on the Right to Counsel in Civil Commitment Cases, and Its Implications for
Clinical Legal Education, 28 WASH. U. J.L. & Po'xY 241, 252-53 (2008) [hereinafter Perlin, I
Might Need a Good Lawyer] (citing CRPD, supra note 1, art. 12).
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States Parties shall ensure effective access to justice for persons
with disabilities on an equal basis with others, including through
the provision of procedural and age appropriate accommoda-
tions, in order to facilitate their effective role as direct and indi-
rect participants, including as witnesses, in all legal proceedings,
including at investigative and other preliminary stages.13 1
While this instrument purports to create binding obligations, it
is important to remember that "[t]he extent to which this Article is
honored in signatory nations will have a major impact on the
extent to which this entire Convention affects persons with mental
disabilities."1 38 If, and only if, there is a mechanism for the
appointment of dedicated counsel 39 can this dream become a
reality.
The ratification of the CRPD marks the most important develop-
ment ever seen in institutional human rights law for persons with
mental disabilities. The CRPD is the detailed, comprehensive, and
integrated result of a careful drafting process. It seeks to reverse
the results of centuries of oppressive behavior and attitudes that
have stigmatized persons with disabilities. 14 0 Its goal is clear: to
promote, protect, and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all
human rights and fundamental freedoms of all persons with disa-
bilities, and to promote respect for their inherent dignity.' 4
Whether this goal will actually be achieved is still far from settled.
V. THE STRUCTURE OF THE DRTAP
If there is no tribunal to adjudicate cases of persons with disabili-
ties in the Asia-Pacific region, it is exceedingly unlikely that individ-
uals in that region will have a forum to which they can bring their
grievances.142 In such case, the CRPD will be little more than an
137. CRPD, supra note 1, art. 13.
138. Perlin, I Might Need a Good Lawyer, supra note 136, at 253.
139. See generally Michael A. Stein et al., Book Review: Cause Lawyering for People with Disa-
bilities, 123 HARv. L. REv. 1658, 1663 (2010) (discussing the significance of "cause lawyers"
in the development of mental disability law in the United States).
140. See, e.g., CRPD, supra note 1, pmbl. (k) (expressing concerns "that, despite these
various instruments and undertakings, persons with disabilities continue to face barriers in
their participation as equal members of society and violations of their human rights in all
parts of the world"); id. pmbl. (n) (recognizing "the importance for persons with disabili-
ties of their individual autonomy and independence, including the freedom to make their
own choices").
141. CRPD, supra note 1, art. 1.
142. By way of example, India and other parts of South Asia lack domestic review bod-
ies for involuntary mental health admissions and lack either the psychiatrists or the mental
health hospitals presumed as the basis for mental health laws, effectively rendering them
almost worthless. See Terry Carney, A Regional Disability Tribunal for Asia and the Pacific:
Changing the Conversation to a "Conversation"?, 7 INT'L J.L. CONTEXT 319, 319 n.2 (2011)
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empty shell. This Section sketches out a preliminary blueprint for
the DRTAP. The creation of a DRTAP would be a definite quan-
tum leap in the quest for an Asian human rights mechanism, and
would give meaning to the obligations created in the CRPD.
The Toyota Foundation funded the initial project to create a
DRTAP, and the Tokyo Advocacy Law Office has directed the
effort since it began in 2008.143 From 2008 to 2009, project leaders
researched domestic disability rights cases in which plaintiffs with
disabilities were unsuccessful, and used these as a prism through
which to examine the necessity and potential of a regional disabil-
ity rights tribunal. 144 An international planning conference was
held in Tokyo in July 2009, and regional meetings were held in
Thailand, South Korea, and Australia in 2010.145 Papers were
presented on the need for a DRTAP at international conferences
in Hong Kong, China, Denmark, Australia, New Zealand, and Tai-
wan in 2010-2011.146 At the Korean meeting, participants decided
that the tribunal should "launch" as a voluntary one and that, ini-
tially, it would be a sub-regional one to include the countries of the
Pacific Rim, Oceania and Thailand.147
A Disability Rights Information Center for Asia and the Pacific
(DRICAP) is developing a website collecting statutes, regulations,
scholarly articles, advocacy news, and case law from selected Asian
and Pacific nations.148 The DRICAP will be housed at New York
(citing A.K. Kala & Kunal Kala, Mental Health Legislation in Developing Countries with Special
Reference to South Asia: Problems and Solutions, 8 GLOBAL Soc. POL'Y 308 (2008)). Only a few
provisions of India's Persons with Disabilities Act expressly confer a right upon a person
that can be vindicated before a court or before the Chief Commissioner. Byrnes, supra
note 71, at 127-44; see also Catherine Renshaw et al., Human Rights Protection in the Pacific:
The Emerging Role of National Human Rights Institutions in the Region, 8 N.Z. J. PUB. & INT'L L.
117, 133 (2010) (discussing the lack of adequate forums in the Pacific region).
143. See Perlin & Ikehara, Creation of a Disability Rights Tribuna4 supra note 53, at 99; see
also Perlin, CRPD, supra note 3; Perlin & Ikehara, Promoting Social Change, supra note 86;
Perlin, Why a Regional Tribunal Is Needed, supra note 87; Ikehara, supra note 64.
144. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin et al., Online Mental Disability Law Education, a Disability
Rights Tribunal, and the Creation of an Asian Disability Law Database: Their Impact on Research,
Training and Teaching of Criminology and Criminal justice in Asia (Dec. 2011) (paper
presented to third annual Asian Criminological Society conference, Taipei, Taiwan) (on
file with author); see also Perlin & Ikehara, Creation ofa Disability Rights Tribunal, supra note
53, at 2; Perlin, supra note 3, at 4-7; Perlin, Why a Regional Tribunal Is Needed, supra note 87,
at 3-8; Perlin & Ikehara, Promoting Social Change, supra note 86.
145. Perlin & Ikehara, Creation of a Disability Rights Tribuna4 supra note 53, at 3.
146. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Creation of a Disability Rights Tribunal for Asia and the
Pacfic: Its Impact on China?, 5-6 (June 2010) (paper presented at the fifth annual European
China Law Studies Association conference, Copenhagen, Denmark) (on file with author).
147. Id. at 2.
148. The website is currently under development and will be available at
www.disabilityrtsinfoAP.com.
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Law School and will be directed by New York Law School Adjunct
Professor Heather Ellis Cucolo. Through the DRICAP, it is hoped,
"lawyers and advocates throughout this region would have a virtual
homeplace dedicated to these issues." 1 4 9
Although the structure of the tribunal is still inchoate, the incor-
porating documents will, at the very least, include sections covering
the DRTAP's general structure, judges, funding, the role of NGOs,
reporting, and remedies.150 Those tasked with the ultimate draft-
ing of the incorporation documents will, of necessity, focus on a
range of operational, logistical and instrument issues, including,
but not limited to, the tribunal's actual composition, its location,
the rules of procedure and pleading to be employed,15 1 the use of
multiple languages, and the need to select one or more "official
languages." States will need to negotiate such fundamental terms
as the DRTAP's jurisdictional competency, parties' voluntary par-
ticipation, the composition of the DRTAP, and the number of
states that will participate. Finally, to establish the DRTAP's legiti-
macy, the body will need to coordinate with other international
and regional human rights bodies and other Asian and Pacific
regional bodies, maintain independence from national oversight,
ensure accountability and respect to those who appear before it,
and implement fair procedures.1 5 2
As to judges, the states that agree to be part of DRTAP must
consider whether there should be seats set aside for citizens of cer-
tain nations and for individuals with disabilities, both mental and
physical. Also, states parties will have to determine whether all
judges will have to be lawyers, or might be non-lawyer advocates.
Judges will need to be well-respected, autonomous from political
interference, and have a demonstrated expertise in disability
law. 153
149. Michael L. Perlin, Online, Distance Legal Education as an Agent of Social Change, 24
PAc. McGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEV. L.J. 95, 105-06 (2011). Professor Cucolo has worked
with the author and Mr. Ikehara on earlier stages of the DRTAP project. See Perlin et al.,
supra note 144, at 3.
150. See generally Naomi Weinstein, Establishing the Disability Rights Tribunal for Asia
and the Pacific 24-41 (unpublished paper) (on file with author) (describing the issues and
concerns that must be considered when establishing a structure for the DRTAP).
151. On the significance of procedural rules in Asian legal reform, see Yuka Kaneko, A
Procedural Approach tojudicial Reform in Asia: Implications fromJapanese Involvement in Vietnam,
23 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 313 (2010).
152. There must also be protocols focusing on the relationship between nations that
have signed the CRPD and those that have not.
153. Along with the question of selection ofjudges, it is also necessary to consider the
role of lawyers appearing before the DRTAP (who will be court-appointed if the client is
indigent), and how these lawyers will be trained in disability law so as to be effective advo-
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It is expected that some funds will come from the United
Nations and others from voluntary contributions.15 4 Charter nego-
tiators will need to determine whether non-governmental organiza-
tions will be able to bring claims before the tribunal, request
advisory opinions, and file amicus briefs in litigation. 15 5 They will
also need to consider how DRTAP decisions will be reported, and
how best to insure free access to decisions online.15 6 Finally, the
entire question of remedies needs to be considered, specifically
addressing the sort of sanctions that will be available, how will com-
pliance be enforced, and what role alternative dispute resolutions
methods might play.' 57
This proposal raises many related, still unresolved issues. Some
of the most contentious will most likely be:
* What will be the impact of voluntary participation on the
ultimate success of such a tribunal?' 58
* Will the judges be independent or representative of their
respective countries? 5 9
* How will the tribunal be funded?16 0
cates. See infra Part VII. See generally Perlin, I Might Need a Good Lawyer, supra note 136
(examining the development of effective representation for persons with mental disabili-
ties facing civil confinement).
154. See, e.g., Peter G. Fischer, The Victims' Trust Fund of the International Criminal Court -
Formation of a Functional Reparations Scheme, 17 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 187, 202 (2003) (noting
that contributions to the International Criminal Court are supplied by governments, non-
governmental organizations, corporations, and private individuals).
155. To avoid the appearance of conflict, it is recommended that NGOs will not have
dedicated seats as judges on DRTAP.
156. See Hester Swift, Product Review: ILR on Justis, 11 LEGAL INFO. MGMT. 146, 146
(2011) (discussing how International Law Reports (ILR) is "often described as the only publi-
cation wholly devoted to the reporting in English of decisions of international courts and
tribunals as well as decisions by national courts on matters of international law"); Fischer,
supra note 154 (discussing Oxford Reports on International Law, an online service).
157. Professor Carole Petersen has urged the inclusion of a mediation mechanism in
DRTAP in an article about the CRPD's mandate for a right to inclusive education. See
Carole Petersen, Inclusive Education and Conflict Resolution: Building a Model to Implement Arti-
cle 24 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in the Asia Pacific, 40 HK L.J.
481, 511 (2010) ("[G]iven the historic reluctance of governments in the Asia Pacific to
create a regional mechanism with enforcement powers, it might be wise to include a volun-
tary mediation program under the auspices of the proposed tribunal."); see also Vicki Waye
& Ping Xiong, The Relationship Between Mediation and Judicial Proceedings in China, 6 AsIN J.
COMP. L. 1 (2011) (examining mediation in a Chinese context).
158. See, e.g., Julian G. Ku, International Delegations and the New World Court Order, 81
WASH. L. REv. 1, 24-31 (2006).
159. See, e.g., Gilbert Guillaume, Some Thoughts on the Independence of International Judges
Vis-d-Vis States, 2 L. & PRAC. INT'L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 163, 163-66 (2003).
160. See, e.g., Lindsey Raub, Positioning Hybrid Tribunals in International Criminal justice,
41 INT'L L. & POL. 1014, 1024-26 (2009).
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* How many nations will be involved, both initially and in the
long term? 6 1
* Will the tribunal's jurisdiction extend to private and public
cases?le 2
* Will there be co-ordination with other international
bodies?1 63
* Will there be coordination with other Asian/Pacific
tribunals?1 64
* What will the relationship be between those nations that
have signed the CRPD and those that have not?1 65
* What will the standing be of NGOs before the tribunal?16 6
* What is the expected scope of the remedies available to the
tribunal?16 7
* Will there be a difference in the way such a tribunal would
operate in monist and dualist nations?'" 8
* Will there be a difference in cases involving nations that have
common law and civil law traditions?' 69
* What sanctions will be available if a defendant refuses to
comply?"10
* How will counsel be appointed? 7 1
161. See Perlin et al., supra note 144, at 3-5.
162. See, e.g., Martin A. Geer, Foreigners in Their Own Land: Cultural Land and Transna-
tional Corporations - Emergent International Rights and Wrongs, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 331, 336
(1998).
163. See, e.g., Antonio Augusto Cangado Trindade, The Merits of Coordination of lnterna-
tional Courts on Human Rights, 2 J. INT'L GRIM. JUST. 309, 309-11 (2004).
164. See, e.g., Beatriz Garcia, Exercising a Community of Interests: A Comparison Between the
Mekong and the Amazon Legal Regimes, 39 H.K L.J. 421 (2009).
165. See supra note 118.
166. See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in the World
Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 331, 340 (1996); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, NGO
Standing and Influence in Regional Human Rights Courts and Commissions, 36 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
911 (2011); Steve Charnovitz, The Illegitimacy of Preventing NGO Participation, 36 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 891, 892-96 (2011); Dana Brakman Reiser & Claire R. Kelly, Linking NGO Account-
ability and the Legitimacy of Global Governance, 36 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1011, 1033-40 (2011).
167. See, e.g., Sonja Starr, Rethinking "Effective Remedies": Remedial Deterrence in Interna-
tional Courts, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693 (2008); Ellen Fasoli, Declaratory judgments and Official
Apologies as Forms of Reparation for the Non-Material Damage Suffered by the State: The Djibouti-
France Case, 7 L. & PRAc. INT'L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 177 (2008).
168. See, e.g., Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Judging Judges: From "Principal-Agent Theory" to
"Constitutional justice" in Multilevel "Judicial Governance" of Economic Cooperation Among Citi-
zens, I1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 827, 871 (2008).
169. See, e.g., Anna Gardella & Luca Radicati di Brozolo, Civil Law, Common Law and
Market Integration: EC Approach to Conflicts of jurisdiction, 51 Am. J. COMP. L. 611 (2003)
170. See, e.g., Anna Spain, Using International Dispute Resolution to Address the Compliance
Question in International Law, 40 GEO. J. INT'L L. 807 (2009).
171. See generally PERLIN, WHEN THE SILENCED ARE HEARD, supra note 2, at 196-98. As
part of their classwork, students in the author's Project-Based Learning course at New York
Law School ("The Creation of a Disability Rights Tribunal for Asia and the Pacific") pre-
pared a set of "white papers" on many of the topics listed in supra notes 158-171.
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The existence of these issues should in no way be read to suggest
that the creation of the DRTAP is an impossible or quixotic under-
taking. These outstanding questions merely reflect the amount of
careful work that needs to be done as this plan moves ahead.
VI. A QUESTION OF TIMING
No longer can we delay actions geared toward the investigation
of human rights abuses and the protection of human rights. A
recent law review article urging the creation of a Southeast Asian
Court of Human Rights concluded that "[i]t is about time that the
region moved ahead and acted towards that goal."' 7 2 All of the
credible evidence supports this position. 7 3 In the absence of a
consensus and political support for the creation of such a court to
adjudicate all human rights matters in Asia, activists, and advocates
have begun work on efforts to create a court focused on the sole
subtopic of disability rights, a DRTAP.174 For multiple reasons, the
creation of a DRTAP would be the single best way to insure that the
CRPD is given authentic and sustainable life in Asia.""5
First, experiences in other regions show that similarly situated
courts and commissions have been powerful forces in mandating
the practical implementation of other U.N. conventions and "soft
law."176 It defies credulity to suggest that the high courts of Ecua-
dor or Gambia would have decided the Congo or Purohit cases the
way that the interregional bodies decided them. 77
172. Hao Duy Phan, A Blueprint for a Southeast Asian Court of Human Rights, 10 ASIAN-
PAC. L. & POL'YJ. 384, 431 (2009).
173. For a range of ongoing human rights abuses in this region, see, e.g., NGO State-
ment on Country Specic Human Rights Defenders to Fourteenth Asia Pacific Forum, 10 ASIA-PAC. J.
Hum. RTs. & L. 97 (2009).
174. See Perlin & Ikehara, Promoting Social Change, supra note 86; see also Perlin, Why a
Regional Tribunal Is Needed, supra note 87; Ikehara, supra note 64.
175. For an example of how domestic laws in just one area of disability law (involuntary
civil commitment) globally fall short of the mandates of the CRPD, see Lee, supra note 135.
176. Soft law includes those norms that: (1) have been articulated in non-binding
form; (2) contain vague and imprecise terms; (3) emanate from bodies lacking interna-
tional lawmaking authority; (4) are directed at non-state actors whose practice cannot con-
stitute customary international law; (5) lack any corresponding theory of responsibility; or
(6) are based solely upon voluntary adherence. Christine Chinkin, Normative Development
in the International Legal System, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BIND-
INC NoRms IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 21, 30 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000); see also
Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard Versus Soft Law in International Security, 52 B.C.
L. REV. 1147, 1147 (2011) (discussing differences between hard law and soft law in another
political context).
177. See supra Part II.B.
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Second, scholars who believe in the universality of human
rights-and who recognize the false consciousness of the specious
Asian values arguments that seek to reject that universality-under-
stand that a DRTAP will be the most effective means of enforcing
human rights in Asia. This is because a tribunal that spans multi-
ple nations in diverse geographic regions, with diverse populations
comprised of diverse ethnicities, races, religions, and cultures will
be better able to decide cases without regard for cultural biases
that may exist in domestic fora. 78
Third, the language of the CRPD-specifically invocation of a
social model and the repudiation of a medical model, the empow-
ering of people with disabilities to be the masters of their own
fates, and the focus on dignity and non-discrimination' 79-tells us
that the time is especially right for such a tribunal. The African
Charter calls for a pledge to achieve a better life for Africans by
recognizing that human rights stem from attitudes of human
beings and implying duties on the part of everyone. 8 0 In the same
way, a DRTAP would similarly highlight and underscore necessary
principles in the achievement of human rights in Asia and the
Pacific. Similar to the European Convention aim of "securing the
universal and effective recognition and observance of the Rights
therein declared,"' 8 ' the DRTAP would seek universal human
rights. A DRTAP would recognize, just as has the Inter-American
Convention, the following:
the essential rights of man are not derived from nationality in a
certain state, but are based upon attributes of the human per-
sonality, and that they therefore justify international protection
in the form of a convention reinforcing or complementing the
protection provided by the domestic law of the American
states.'82
Fourth, without establishing a DRTAP, severe violations of
human rights for persons with mental disabilities will continue to
occur in the states, due to local inability and lack of opportunity to
enforce human rights and address ongoing rights violations. 88
178. See supra Part III.
179. See supra Part IV.
180. African Charter, supra note 6, pmbl.; see also Ben Kiromba Twinomugisha, The Role
of the judiciary in the Promotion of Democracy in Uganda, 9 AFR. HUM. RTs. J. 1 (2009) (discuss-
ing the role of a national judiciary in Africa in the promotion of human rights through
judicial review).
181. European Convention, supra note 44, pmbl.
182. American Convention, supra note 5, pmbl.
183. See PERLIN, WHEN THE SILENCED ARE HEARD, supra note 2, at 81-102 (discussing the
pervasiveness of the violations in question); see also Perlin, The Universal Factors, supra note
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Fifth and finally, from a perspective of economics, the timing is
right for creation of a DRATAP. If CRPD-signatory nations such as
China and Thailand emerge as economic and progressive leaders,
they must mirror other major nations in other regions of the world
and demonstrate their commitment to human rights as other
major nations around the world have.18 4 One significant and com-
pelling way would be to support the establishment of the DRTAP as
a means of fostering and promoting better international
relations.18 5
VII. ROLE OF COUNSEL
If this DRTAP is to have authentic value and lead to meaningful
and ameliorative change, there must be a mechanism for the
appointment of dedicated, knowledgeable counsel to litigants.' 8 6
There is no question that one of the most critical aspects of law
reform is the presence of dedicated and knowledgeable counsel.8 7
But for adequate counsel, no judicial system can work effectively to
protect human rights for a person when his or her human rights
are infringed.'88 Because of their historically determined and uni-
2, at 333; Michael L. Perlin, Chimes of Freedom: International Human Rights and Institutional
Mental Disability Law, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 423, 427 (2002).
184. See, e.g., Katie Lee, China and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
Prospects and Challenges, 6 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 445, 452 (2007); Jacques de Lisle, Human
Rights, Civil Wrongs and Foreign Relations: A "Sinical" Look at the Use of U.S. Litigation to Address
Human Rights Abuses Abroad, 52 DEPAUL L. REv. 473, 481-82 (2002); see also Tomuschat,
supra note 87, at 228 ("Some of the discrepancies that have arisen in the field of human
rights [in China] are hardly concealed by the actors involved."). On the state of human
rights in Thailand, see, e.g., Heather Montgomery, Defining Child Trafficking & Child Prosti-
tution: The Case of Thailand, 9 SEATTLE J. Soc. JusT. 775, 804 (2011).
185. See, e.g., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN ASIA: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES
(Tom Ginsburg & Albert H.Y. Chen eds., 2009) (examining the role of courts in social
development throughout Southeast Asia and the Pacific Rim).
186. See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILTY LAw: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
§§ 2B-1 to -15 (2d ed. 1998) (discussing the appointment of counsel to persons with
mental disabilities in the United States).
187. See Perlin, "A Change Is Gonna Come", supra note 121, at 496.
188. See SUE FARRAN, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC: CHALLENGES AND CHANCES
243-46 (2009). Professor Terry Carney has taken issue with this position, concluding that
he would "put [more] lawyers last on the 'wish list' of needed reforms." Carney, supra note
142, at 325. This author disagrees with him profoundly, based on forty years of evidence
from the United States. See PERLIN, WHEN THE SILENCED ARE HEARD, supra note 2, at 45-46;
PERLIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 13-227. Without such counsel, any long-lasting efforts at
ameliorative reform are doomed to failure. See generally Perlin, I Might Need a Good Lawyer,
supra note 136. Carney recommends that the creation of a tribunal such as DRTAP be
"delayed until after an adequate body of more diffuse conversations has taken place
between governments, non-governmental organisations and civil society" as a "governance-
based approach." Carney, supra note 142, at 329. This position is counter-productive, and
no matter how well intentioned, is likely to lead to decades more of disempowerment for
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versally perceived powerlessness and vulnerability, persons with dis-
abilities necessarily require adequate counsel to protect and realize
their rights.18 9 This makes the issue in question all the more criti-
cal in a disability rights tribunal context.190
One of the reasons this is especially important in this area of the
law and policy is the omnipresence of "sanism."191 Sanism is an
irrational prejudice of the same quality and character of other irra-
tional prejudices that cause, and are reflected in, prevailing social
attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry.'9 2 It
permeates mental disability law, affecting all participants in the
mental disability law system: litigants, fact-finders, counsel, and
expert and lay witnesses. Its corrosive effects have warped mental
disability law jurisprudence both domestically and internation-
ally.193
Sanism-closely entwined with pretextuality' 94-has controlled,
and continues to control, modern mental disability law. Just as
importantly, these concepts continue to exert this control invisibly.
This invisibility means that the most important aspects of mental
disability law-not just the law "on the books," but, more impor-
tantly, the law in action and practice-remains hidden from the
public discussions about mental disability law.195 Dedicated,
persons with disabilities in this region, and the continuation of the sort of social "stigma,
denial of human dignity, and neglect" that he so aptly decries. See id.
189. See Michael L. Perlin, For the Misdemeanor Outlaw: The Impact of the ADA on the Insti-
tutionalization of Criminal Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REv. 193, 219 (2000)
(discussing how persons with mental disabilities have always been relegated to a position of
political powerlessness).
190. See PERLIN, WHEN THE SILENCED ARE HEARD, supra note 2, at 45-46.
191. Michael L. Perlin, "Everybody Is Making Love/Or Else Expecting Rain": Considering the
Sexual Autonomy Rights of Persons Institutionalized Because of Mental Disability in Forensic Hospi-
tals and in Asia, 83 U. WASH. L. REv. 481, 506 (2008).
192. Id. at 486.
193. Id. at 487.
194. See Michael L. Perlin, "Half-Wracked Preludice Leaped Forth ": Sanism, Pretextuality, and
Why and How Mental Disability Law Developed as It Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUEs 3, 18
(1999). This article states as follows:
The pretexts of the forensic mental health system are reflected both in the testi-
mony of forensic experts and in the decisions of legislators and fact-finders.
Experts frequently testify in accordance with their own self-referential concepts of
"morality" and openly subvert statutory and case law criteria that impose rigorous
behavioral standards as predicates for commitment or that articulate functional
standards as prerequisites for an incompetency to stand trial finding. Often this
testimony is further warped by a heuristic bias. Expert witnesses-like the rest of
us-succumb to the seductive allure of simplifying cognitive devices in their
thinking, and employ such heuristic gambits as the vividness effect or attribution
theory in their testimony. Id.
195. See MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL
148-58 (2000).
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trained, and knowledgeable lawyers are needed to combat the con-
tamination thus caused by sanism.196
Public interest litigation in other aspects of substantive law has
had a transformative impact as an "effective tool for the enforce-
ment of fundamental rights, as well as for creating a legal and
social environment in which justice could be made available to
[the marginalized]."197 In the context of a regional human rights
tribunal, such litigation is also more likely to "translate into sub-
stantive improvements in the lives not only of petitioners to their
systems, but of the far larger universe of individuals who will never
see the inside of a supranational court."198 Litigation such as the
sort that would be brought before the DRTAP requires dedicated
counsel, a circumstance that is rare at an international level in
cases involving disability rights; without such counsel, it is likely
that the CRPD will be no more than a "paper victory" for persons
with disabilities in Asian nations.199
Globally, there is little good news. In many nations, there is no
mental health law at all. 2 0 0 In others, there is simply no provision
for counsel. In others, counsel appears to be present in name only,
what is referred to disparagingly in the literature as the "warm
body" problem.201 In only a few instances does counsel appear to
196. See Perlin & Szeli, Evolution and Contemporary Challenges, supra note 115; Perlin &
Szeli, Promise, supra note 115, at 246.
197. M. Amir-UI Islam, Public Interest Litigation: Experiences in South Asia: (Rights in Search
of Remedies), 7 INT'L. REV. CONSTITUTIONALISM 129, 142 (2007); see also Christine M. Forster
& Vedna Jivan, Public Interest Litigation and Human Rights Implementation: The Indian and
Australian Experience, 3 ASIAN J. COMP. L. 1 (2008).
198. James L. Cavallaro & Stephanie E. Brewer, Reevaluating Regional Human Rights Liti-
gation in the Twenty-First Century: The Case of the Inter-American Court, 102 Am. J. INT'L L. 768,
770 (2008). For an example of such litigation, see supra text accompanying notes 37-42,
discussing the impact of the litigation brought in Paraguay against the state-run Neuro-
Psychiatric Hospital.
199. See, e.g., Perlin, "A Change Is Gonna Come", supra note 121, at 490-91; Michael L.
Perlin, "What's Good is Bad, What's Bad is Good, You'll Find Out When You Reach the Top You're
on the Bottom": Are the Americans with Disabilities Act (and Olmstead v. L.C.) Anything More
Than "Idiot Wind?", 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 235, 246 (2002) ("Mental disability law is
strewn with examples of 'paper victories."') (quoting Michael Lottman, Paper Victories and
Hard Realities, in PAPER VICTORIES AND HARD REALITIES: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LEGAL
AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY DISABLED 93 (Valeric J. Bradley & Gary J.
Clarke eds., 1976)).
200. See Perlin, CRPD, supra note 3, at 18-19.
201. See Katey Thom, "Balancing Individual Rights with Public Safety ": The Decision-Making
of the Mental Health Review Tribunal in New Zealand Uune 2011) (paper presented to the
International Academy of Law and Mental Health annual Congress, Berlin, Germany,
June, 2011) (on file with author) [hereinafter Thom, Balancing] (noting that 6.3% of
patients were released at "contested hearings" between 2003 and 2010); see also Katey
Thom, Individual Rights vs. State Obligations: Striking a Balance in Appeals Before the Mental
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be doing a remotely adequate job.202 Katey Thom summarizes the
literature as follows:
* Tribunals conduct 'back to front' decision-making. Members
firstly determine the outcome they prefer and then select the
evidence to accord with this view. 203
* Extra-legal factors play a big part in decision-making. For exam-
ple, Hepworth found that judgments were frequently based
on subjective feelings and intuition about the patient.204
* Tribunals have also been seen to be merely 'rubber-stamping' medical
opinions. Decisions are based on the treating clinician's per-
ception of what the patient needs, rather than strict applica-
tion of legal tests. 205
* It follows that in the 'rubber stamping' context, the source
rather than content of evidence becomes the best predictor of outcome
for the applicant.206
Although there is a right to counsel in India, no such right exists
in many other Asian nations, including Afghanistan, China, Indo-
nesia, Pakistan, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam. 207
The lack of provision of counsel in litigation to enforce disability
rights is troubling for many reasons, not the least of which is that,
without the availability of such counsel, it has been "virtually impos-
sible" to imagine the existence of the bodies of involuntary civil
commitment law, right to treatment law, right to refuse treatment
law, or any aspect of forensic mental disability law that are now
taken for granted in the United States. Without the presence of
Health Review Tribunal (May 2011) (paper presented to the Mental Health and Social Jus-
tice Symposium, Auckland, New Zealand) (on file with author); Abbe Smith, Carrying on in
Criminal Court: Wen Criminal Defense Is Not So Sexy and Other Grievances, 1 CLINICAL L. REV.
723, 735 (1995) ("The right to counsel is not just about having a warm body, any warm
body stand beside a criminal defendant.").
202. Israel is one non-Western nation that provides counsel in such cases, and in which
counsel appears to have some significant success. See Arie Bauer et al., Regional Psychiatric
Boards in Israel: Expectations and Realities, 28 INT'LJ.L. & PSYCHIATRY 661, 668 (2005) ("[I]t
seems advisable that all persons hospitalized compulsorily . . . be legally represented at
[Regional Psychiatric Board] hearings, in order to ensure the greatest possible protection
for their rights, first and foremost their liberty."). Bauer works for the Forensic Psychiatry
Unit of the Mental Health Services Division of the Israel Ministry of Mental Health. See
Arie Bauer, Trends in Involuntary Psychiatric Hospitalization in Israel 1991-2000, 30 INT'LJ.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 60, 67 (2007) (speculating that amendment to national mental health law pro-
viding for counsel in all RPB proceedings "will bring about a diminution in the number of
involuntary hospitalizations").
203. Thom, Balancing, supra note 201, at 3 (citations omitted).
204. D. Hepworth, The Decision-Process of the Mental-Health Review Tribunal: Analysis of
Research Findings, 23 MED. SC. & L. 171, 172 (1983).
205. Thom, Balancing, supra note 201, at 3.
206. Id.
207. Perlin, I Might Need a Good Lawyer, supra note 136, at 251.
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counsel, legal reforms, particularly in nations with developing
economies, "will all too often be a hollow shell."2 08
The CRPD mandates that "States Parties shall take appropriate
measures to provide access by persons with disabilities to the sup-
port they may require in exercising their legal capacity."209 The
CRPD further commands that "States Parties shall ensure effective
access to justice for persons with disabilities on an equal basis with
others ... in all legal proceedings ... including at investigative and
other preliminary stages." 210 These provisions underscore the cru-
cial importance of dedicated counsel and make mandatory the
appointment of such counsel. The presence of counsel is the
lynchpin to authentic change in this area of the law.2 1 1 A regional
human rights tribunal must therefore provide adequate counsel to
help persons with disabilities to file, present, and argue cases. 212
"The extent to which this Article is honored in signatory nations
will have a major impact on the extent to which this entire Conven-
tion affects persons with mental disabilities."2 1 3 If, and only if,
there is a mechanism for the appointment of dedicated counsel,
can the dreams generated by the CRPD become a reality.2 14
208. Id. at 250-52 (quoting Stephen Golub, The Importance of Legal Aid in Legal Reform,
in ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN AFRICA AND BEYOND: MAKING THE RULE OF LAW A REALITY XV, XViii
(Penal Reform Int'l & Bluhm Legal Clinic eds., 2007) [hereinafter JUSTICE IN AFRICA]).
209. CRPD, supra note 1, art. 12, § 3.
210. Id. art. 13, § 1.
211. On how online education can serve as an engine for social change in the context
of international human rights law, see Michael L. Perlin, Ain't No Goin' Back: Teaching
Mental Disability Law Courses on Line, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 991 (2006); Michael L. Perlin,
An Internet-based Mental Disability Law Program: Implications for Social Change in Nations with
Developing Economies, 40 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 435 (2007). It is essential that cadres of trained
lawyers be created if there is to be meaningful representation before the DRTAP; online
education offers the promise of an economic and efficient way of providing this level of
high-quality legal training. See Perlin, CRDP, supra note 3, at 23. On legal education in
Asia in general, see LEGAL EDUCATION IN ASIA: GLOBALIZATION, CHANGE AND CONTEXTS
(Stacey Steele & Kathryn Taylor, eds., 2010). On the globalization of public interest law in
general, see Richard L. Abel, The Globalization of Public Interest Law, 13 UCLAJ. INT'L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 295 (2008).
212. See generally Perlin, I Might Need a Good Lawyer, supra note 136 (discussing the right
to counsel in the context of the need for adequate counsel).
213. Id. at 253.
214. Although the common assumption is that Asian citizens, especially those with a
Confucianist background, prefer "a conciliatory approach to the settlement of disputes,"
Bobby K Y. Wong, Traditional Chinese Philosophy and Dispute Resolution, 30 H.KLJ. 304, 304
(2000), this conclusion has been sharply questioned in an empirical study that concludes
"there is nothing immoral in turning to a more coercive forum," Carole J. Petersen, A
Progressive Law with Weak Enforcement? An Empirical Study of Hong Kong's Disability Law, 25
DISABILITY STUD. Q. 1, 12 (2005); see also Junwu Pan, Chinese Philosophy and International
Law, 1 ASIAN J. INT'L L. 233 (2011) (discussing Chinese philosophy and international law).
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Law schools must commit themselves to the creation of clinical
programs assigned to train lawyers to provide legal representation
to indigent persons facing involuntary civil commitment.215
Regarding the risks of improperly trained attorneys, the author has
previously written the following:
In the civil commitment context, any sanism-inspired blunders
by lawyers can easily be fatal to the client's chance of success. If
a lawyer rejects the notion that his client may be competent
(indeed, if s/he engages in the not-atypical "presumption of
incompetency" that is all too often de rigeur in these cases), the
chances are far slimmer that s/he will advocate for such a client
in the way that lawyers have been taught-or at the least, should
be taught-to advocate for their clients. In nations with no tra-
ditions of an "expanded due process model" in cases involving
persons subject to commitment to psychiatric institutions or
those already institutionalized, a lawyer's sanism can be fatal to
his client's chance for release or for a judicial order mandating
amelioration of conditions of confinement, or access to or free-
dom from treatment.216
The creation and international dissemination and proliferation
of clinical programs to train law students in these issues217 would
be the best way to prevent such "sanist-inspired blunders." In their
thorough and thoughtful analysis of the treatment of mental disa-
bility issues under the European Convention, Peter Bartlett and his
colleagues lay down the gauntlet: the challenge of the next twenty-
five years will be "to breathe life into Convention provisions as they
apply to [persons with mental disabilities] and to press for full
implementation of the standards that are won through litigation
and political advances."218 The provision of competent and knowl-
edgeable counsel is the best means of "breath [ing] this "life" into
the CRPD, especially in Asia.
The creation of a DRTAP is also consonant with the aims of ther-
apeutic jurisprudence (TJ). One of the most important legal theo-
215. See PERLIN, WHEN THE SILENCED ARE HEARD, supra note 2, at 104-11.
216. Perlin, I Might Need a Good Lawyer, supra note 136, at 262.
217. See PERLIN, WHEN THE SILENCED ARE HEARD, supra note 2, at 104-11. On the need
for the creation of clinical programs as a part of a comprehensive human rights legal edu-
cation that would best prepare students to focus on global justice issues when they enter
law practice, see Perlin, I Might Need a Good Lawyer, supra note 136, at 258; Roy T. Stuckey,
Preparing Students to Practice Law: A Global Problem in Need of Global Solutions, 43 S. TEx. L.
REV. 649, 652-53 (2002); Philip lya, Enhancing the Teaching of Human Rights in African Uni-
versities: What Role for Law School Clinics?, 7 INT'LJ. CLINICAL LEGAL EDUC. 20 (2005); David
McQuoid-Mason, The Supply Side: The Role of Lawyers in the Provision of Legal Aid - Some
Lessons from South Africa, in JUSTICE IN AFRICA, supra note 208, at 97.
218. PETER BARTLETT ET AL., MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 28 (2007).
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retical developments of the past two decades has been the creation
and dynamic growth of TJ.2 1 9 Initially employed in cases involving
individuals with mental disabilities, but subsequently expanded far
beyond that narrow area,220 TJ presents a new model for assessing
the impact of case law and legislation, recognizing that, as a thera-
peutic agent, the law that can have therapeutic or anti-therapeutic
consequences. The ultimate aim of TJ is to determine whether
legal rules, procedures, and lawyer roles can or should be reshaped
to enhance their therapeutic potential while not subordinating
due process principles.221
The CRPD is a document that resonates with TJ values. It
reflects the three core TJ principles of "voice, validation and volun-
tary participation" articulated by Professor Amy Ronner,222 and it
"look[s] at law as it actually impacts people's lives." 2 23 Each section
of the CRPD empowers persons with mental disabilities, and one of
the major aims of TJ is explicitly the empowerment of those whose
lives are regulated by the legal system.224 Dedicated counsel would
219. See PERLIN, WHEN THE SILENCED ARE HEARD, supra note 2, at 203-18.
220. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Things Have Changed: Looking at Non-Institutional Mental
Disability Law Through the Sanism Filter, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 535, 544-45 (2002-03) (dis-
cussing application of therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ) to such areas as contracts law, tort
law, gay rights law, mediation, and preventive law).
221. See, e.g., DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEU-
TIC AGENT (1990); DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCEJ. WINICK, LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY. RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1996); BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMIT-
MENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL (2005); David B. Wexler, Two Decades of Thera-
peutic jurisprudence, 24 ToURO L. REv. 17 (2008); Michael L. Perlin, "You Have Discussed
Lepers and Crooks": Sanism in Clinical Teaching, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 683 (2003); Michael L.
Perlin, "My Best Friend, My Doctor, Won't Even Say What It Is I've Got": The Role and Significance
of Counsel in Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735 (2005). For a transna-
tional perspective, see Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton, Mental Health Law and Therapeutic
jurisprudence, in DISPUTES AND DILEMMAS IN HEALTH LAw 91 (Ian R. Freckelton & Kerry
Anne Peterson eds., 2006). On the potential use of TJ in the resolution of matters arising
from the CRPD, see PERLIN, supra note 2, at 203-28. On the relationship between TJ and
the practice of mental disability law in central and eastern Europe, see Winick, supra note
50. On the need for human rights scholarship to embrace social science insights, see Ryan
Goodman et al., Social Science and Human Rights, in UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL ACIoN, PRO-
MOTING HUMAN RIGHTS (Ryan Goodman et al. eds., forthcoming 2012).
222. See Amy Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Participation: Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, Miranda and juveniles, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 89, 93-96 (2002).
223. Bruce Winick, Foreword: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives on Dealing with Victims
of Crime, 33 NOVA L. REv. 535, 535 (2009).
224. See Michael L. Perlin, Understanding the Intersection Between International Human
Rights and Mental Disability Law: The Role of Dignity 8 (Dec. 2011) (paper presented to the
annual meeting of the Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies Network, New York City)
(on file with author).
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best be able to infuse DRTAP proceedings with a therapeutic juris-
prudence perspective. 225
VIII. CONCLUSION
The CRPD is, potentially, the single most transformative legal
initiative ever created to protect the rights of persons with disabili-
ties, especially mental disabilities. Under current conditions, how-
ever, it is unlikely that it will have any significant impact on this
population in Asia and the Pacific because of the lack of a regional
court or commission in that area. The creation of a disability rights
tribunal for that region offers the most likely redemptive solution
to this dilemma. Yet, the desired impact will not flow from the
creation of the DRTAP alone; it must include a coherent means of
providing trained lawyers, specifically educated in mental disability
law, to represent persons with disabilities who appear as parties
before the DRTAP. It is only through the provision of vigorous
and dedicated advocacy that the CRPD's promise can be fulfilled.
DRTAP-in conjunction with the expansion of law-student train-
ing-is the best way of achieving that promise.
225. See Perlin, "There Must Be Some Way Out of Here", supra note 17, at 21-25.
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